



ONLINE DATA PROCESSING CONSENT UNDER EU LAW: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE UK






This article analyses the results of an empirical study on the 200 most popular UK-based websites in various sectors of e-commerce services. The study provides empirical evidence on unlawful processing of personal data. It comprises a survey on the methods used to seek and obtain consent to process personal data for direct marketing and advertisement, and a test on the frequency of unsolicited commercial emails (UCE) received by customers as a consequence of their registration and submission of personal information to a website. Part One of the article presents a conceptual and normative account of data protection, with a discussion of the ethical values on which EU data protection law is grounded and an outline of the elements that must be in place to seek and obtain valid consent to process personal data. Part Two discusses the outcomes of the empirical study, which unveils a significant departure between EU legal theory and practice in data protection. Although a wide majority of the websites in the sample (69%) has in place a system to ask separate consent for engaging in marketing activities, it is only 16.2% of them that obtain a consent which is valid under the standards set by EU law. The test with UCE shows that only one out of three websites (30.5%) respects the will of the data subject not to receive commercial communications. It also shows that, when submitting personal data in online transactions, there is a high probability (50%) of incurring in a website that will ignore the refusal of consent and will send UCE. The article concludes that there is severe lack of compliance of UK online service providers with essential requirements of data protection law. In this respect, it suggests that there is inappropriate standard of implementation, information and supervision by the UK authorities, especially in light of the clarifications provided at EU level.





This article investigates the practice of obtaining consent for the processing of personal data in the online environment and provides quantitative evidence on unlawful processing of such data. The analysis is based on an empirical study conducted on a population of UK websites, and draws conclusions on the basis of the requirements laid down under EU data protection law.​[1]​
With the expansion of e-commerce, social networking and e-governance, submission of personal data to websites has become an essential prerequisite for taking advantage of online services or facilities, and the processing of these data for commercial communications and direct marketing is a key feature in many websites’ business models.​[2]​ At the same time, under EU law data processing is not lawful unless there is a legal ground for legitimising it. In particular, the current legal regime set by Directive 95/46/EC (hereinafter the Data Protection Directive) provides for consent as a general ground for lawfulness of the processing of personal data.​[3]​ This is the first of six different bases to legitimise data processing, and ‘unambiguous consent’ of the data subject is laid down as the central condition upon which data processing is legitimised.​[4]​ For instance, when an online service collects personal data with a view to perform or commence a contract, it is not entitled to process those data for purposes that exceed the performance of the contract—such as direct marketing and advertisement—unless it has obtained unambiguous consent to do so. This is precisely the scenario that is discussed in this article.
Despite the fact that consent is a key requirement for the legitimacy of many forms of data processing in the online world, there may be situations where the conditions that need to be met for consent to be valid are not clear. Legal uncertainty as to the scope and meaning of consent in data processing may not only lead to divergent approaches in different jurisdictions, but it may also create controversy as to which  practices online service providers should follow to comply with EU data protection law. The various interpretations of data protection consent by the different EU Member States, for instance, do not necessarily match the concept of consent as envisaged in EU data protection law. 
In this respect, the UK provides an interesting case to study. In April 2009, the EU Commission has found that, among some identified gaps in its current data protection rules, the UK failed to implement in its national law​[5]​ the definition of consent as the freely given, specific and informed indication of a person’s wishes.​[6]​ Ambiguity as to the concept of data processing consent accelerates in the online world where technology gives room for various, possibly ambiguous, methods for expressing this indication of wish. In some cases, it may not even be clear what constitutes a freely given, specific and informed consent. 
Beyond its importance from a legal and policy perspective, legal uncertainty on data processing consent may also raise social concerns. A survey published in June 2011 suggests that “nearly all Europeans would like to give their specific approval before collection and processing of their personal information”.​[7]​ An early survey requested by the European Commission in 2008 reveals that most EU citizens (64%) are concerned about whether organisations that collect their personal data handle them in an appropriate manner. This survey also demonstrates that the vast majority of internet users (82%) feel insecure about the transmission of their personal data over the internet.​[8]​ 
Up till now, the issue of consent for data processing has attracted scholarly and policy attention, but there is little empirical evidence as to whether commercial websites comply with data protection law in this respect. For instance, the aforementioned surveys focus on the perspective of internet users but do not address the issue of the websites’ compliance with the relevant legal requirements. A study on the compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 by UK based websites has been carried out in 2002, mainly with the aim of identifying critical areas and providing best practices in the application of the newly introduced legislation.​[9]​ Other empirical studies have focused on critical issues of e-privacy, such as the practices of children’s websites in processing personal data,​[10]​ or have addressed the processing of personal data in the broader context of the analysis of websites’ terms and conditions.​[11]​ A comprehensive study on a large sample of Israeli websites has been conducted by Michael Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren.​[12]​ The study, which has been carried out in a jurisdiction that shares many similarities with EU data protection law,​[13]​ highlights the low level of compliance with respect to a wide range of legal requirements (most notably notice and consent) and questions the viability of a single regulatory regime that fits all the players in the online environment.​[14]​
In light of the variety of privacy policies of online service providers and of the uncertainty as to the meaning of data processing consent in this context, a straightforward question arises: to what extent is data protection law obeyed in the online environment? More specifically: how is the requirement of unambiguous consent, as laid down by EU data protection law,  respected when personal data are stored and processed for purposes of direct marketing and advertisement?
This paper addresses the question from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
Part One of the paper sets the scene for the study. Here, we provide a conceptual and normative account of data protection in light of the Treaty of Lisbon. We also identify the ethical or moral values on which data protection is grounded in order to interpret, defend, and reinforce the centrality of consent as a key ground for the lawfulness of personal data processing. Following, we define consent for data processing by providing a theoretical analysis of this notion and outlining the elements that have to be in place to seek and obtain valid consent in the context of the relevant legal provisions of the acquis communautaire.




CONSENT IN EU DATA PROTECTION LAW: LEGAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

a. EU Data protection Law
Data protection is a complex and multifaceted concept both from a social and a legal point of view. Traditionally, the primary object of data protection laws has been identified with the protection of personal privacy within the context of processing operations involving personal data. However, at least under EU law, privacy and data protection are distinct, yet complementary, fundamental legal rights. They derive their normative force from values that - although at times coincidental and interacting in a variety of ways - may be conceptualised independently.
The concept of privacy was first developed as an independent legal value when Brandeis and Warren identified it as a tort action, defining it as ‘the right to be left alone’.​[15]​ Since then, it has been largely accepted that, in its most general accession, privacy protection is a legal way of drawing a line at how far society or other individual subjects may intrude into a person's own affairs. It entails that such a person should be left able to conduct their personal legitimate affairs relatively free from unwanted intrusions. As such, privacy is an expression of human dignity, development of human personality, and freedom of the individual.​[16]​
At legislative level, the experience of totalitarian regimes in the 20th Century pushed European nations into attaching great importance to the right to privacy, as it had been demonstrated how easily it can be violated, and how extreme the consequences of such violations can be. Privacy was soon elevated as a human right and its standard at international level was enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and later, at European level, was incorporated in the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms (ECHR).​[17]​
The considerable body of literature on the concept of privacy  exemplifies the difficulty in defining with precision what remains a broad and at times ambiguous term, but it also helps to set the basis for distinguishing ‘data protection’ from ‘privacy’.
Personal data protection is a distinctive European innovation in law that over the years has been gaining a mixed fortune outside the EU, from acceptance and emulation in a number of non-EU jurisdictions, to criticism and disputes in others, such as the US. Certainly, the horrors of recent European history and the subsequent international conventions played an important role in the development of data protection laws across Europe and, ultimately, at EU level in the adoption of the Data Protection Directive. Two other factors, however, proved decisive for its enactment under the remit of the EU: (i) the progressive development in computers and information technologies together with the dangers that this could represent for individuals, transcending national affairs; and (ii) the need for the free movement of personal data within the Community to enable trade and prevent conflict arising from separate national regimes.​[18]​ In the end, the real aims and scope of the Data Protection Directive were both the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of European citizens, and the achievement of the internal market. Both objectives were equally important, even though the jurisdiction of the EU on this subject rested on internal market grounds, having its legal basis in Article 100a of the EC Treaty (now Article 114 TFEU).
A sector-specific regime with regard to privacy and electronic communications was the recently amended Directive 2002/58/EC (the so-called ‘e-Privacy Directive’).​[19]​ This is a lex specialis vis-à-vis the Data Protection Directive, which provides for a regime exclusively applicable to providers of publicly available electronic communication services (e.g. telecom and internet service providers) with regard to the processing of personal data in electronic communications. All the same, the EU legislator consistently took a rigorous ‘fundamental human rights’ approach. This stance was particularly important because it meant that data protection automatically trumped other interests and could not be traded-off for economic benefits.​[20]​
This position has been made explicit lately by Article 16 TFEU which elevates the provision on data protection to a ‘provision of general application’ under Title II alongside other fundamental principles of the EU. It also imposes on the EU legislator to establish a certain and unequivocal legal framework for data protection. Equally, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU has become binding, and in its Article 8 it recognises the protection of personal data as an autonomous right distinguished from ‘privacy’.
Indeed, data protection refers to the protection through regulation of personal information pertaining to an identified or identifiable individual (data subject). Individuals do not own information about themselves. Information does not pre-exist to its expression or disclosure but it is always to some extent constructed or created by more than one agent.​[21]​ Normatively, no proprietary rights exist on personal information. It pertains to an individual but it does not belong to him or her in a proprietary sense. Those who process personal data (data controllers) have the right to process those data as long as such processing is in compliance with procedural rules set by law. The objective of data protection law is to protect individuals not against data processing per se, but against unjustified collection, storage, use, and dissemination of the data pertaining to them.​[22]​ As persuasively shown by Hert and Gutwirth, data protection cannot be reduced to a late privacy spin-off echoing a privacy right with regard to personal data, but it formulates the conditions under which information processing is legitimate. While privacy laws derive their normative force from the need to protect the legitimate opacity of the individual through prohibitive measures, data protection forces the transparency of the processing of personal data enabling its full control by the data subjects where the processing is not authorised by the law itself as necessary for societal reasons. In short, data protection law focuses on the activities of the processors and it enforces their accountability, thus regulating an accepted exercise of power.​[23]​
	These principles are reflected in provisions of the Data Protection Directive, such as those that require that data processing must be done for legitimate, explicit and precise purposes, which have to be previously notified to the concerned individual (principles of purpose specification and data minimisation); or the provisions granting to data subjects the right of access to their data; or, again, those requiring that there should be a valid legal basis for the data processing, such as consent of the data subject, or a legal obligation (the latter two may be summarised under the ‘principle of necessity’ of the processing which still needs to be notified to data subjects).​[24]​
Nowadays there is an unprecedented scale of personal data stored by online service providers and used for commercial purposes. Information processing and technologies have a clear potential to dramatically influence the lives of people and this puts an exceptional power in the hands of those who use them—a  risk that has only recently been perceived by business and consumer associations alike.​[25]​ Like privacy, therefore, data protection finds its roots in the idea that democratic societies should not be turned into systems of power  resting on control, surveillance, actual or predictive profiling, classification, social sorting, and discrimination. Data protection is not only a matter of individual liberty, intimacy, and dignity of individuals but a wider personality right aimed at developing people’s social identity as citizens and consumers alike. Hence, it has to be agreed with those concluding that, although “data protection principles might seem less substantive and more procedural compared to other rights (…) they are in reality closely tied to substantial values and protect a broad scale of fundamental values”.​[26]​ that on many occasions may overlap or intersect, but remain separate from those of privacy. For that reason, it also has important connotations for society as a whole and it constitutes an important legislative tool to protect collective social goods and fundamental values of a modern democratic order where citizens freely develop their personality and autonomy. Therefore, both privacy and data protection regimes (i.e. seclusion and legitimate opacity on the one side, and inclusion and participation on the other side) represent a bundle of legal protections and tools to pursue the common goal of a free and democratic society where citizens develop their own personality freely and autonomously through individual reflexive self-determination and for collective deliberative decision making regarding the rules of social cooperation.​[27]​
From this perspective, granting to individuals control over their personal information is not only a tool to allow them control over the persona they project in society free from unreasonable or unjustified associations, manipulations, distortions, misrepresentations, alterations or constraints on their true identity. It is also a fundamental value pertaining to humans to keep and develop their personality in a manner that allows them to fully participate in society without having to conform thoughts, beliefs, behaviours or preferences to those of the majority or those set from above by the industry for commercial interest.​[28]​ In this sense, the rights conferred by data protection legislation are participatory rights of informational self-determination, where the requirement of individual consent for the processing of data is the cornerstone unless the processing is necessary, subject to notice to data subjects,​[29]​ for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party, for compliance with a legal obligation of the data controller, to protect a vital interest of the data subject him/herself, for public interest, or for overriding rights of the data controller or third parties.​[30]​ As such, the instrument of consent as the tool to grant such participatory right rests on the expression of a classical liberal conception of autonomy and individualism.

b. Data Processing Consent
The issue of consent is a complex one that raises difficult questions in many areas of the law.​[31]​ In this study, consent is tied specifically to personal data protection and the substantial values which it aims to safeguard.
At European level, Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU explicitly recognises consent of data subjects as the main condition to enjoy the fundamental right to the protection of personal data:
“[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data (…)” and “data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law” [emphasis added]
Likewise, the central legal requirement under the current legal framework set by the Data Protection Directive is that personal data must be processed fairly. In the absence of another necessary basis set by the law, the ‘unambiguous consent’ of the data subject is the central ground for processing which empowers the data subject in the control over their data and in their self-determination.​[32]​ The Directive’s definition of consent is limited to "any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed".​[33]​ 
Similarly, the e-Privacy Directive explicitly provides that the definition of consent of the Data Protection Directive shall apply.​[34]​ This means that the criteria to determine whether consent is valid are the same as those established by the Data Protection Directive.
The EU Commission has recognised that the "notion of 'unambiguous consent' (Article 7a) in particular, as compared with the notion of 'explicit consent' in Article 8, needs further clarification and more uniform interpretation".​[35]​ In maintaining their duty to transpose the provisions of the Data Protection Directive into domestic law, the Member States – with the exception of the UK - all allow for the processing of personal data on the basis of consent in terms almost identical to those used in the Directive, or at least close to it with some additional requirements.​[36]​ Moreover, in the majority of countries consent is given primary status over other criteria. This seems to be in line with Recital 30 of the Directive that considers consent as the first condition to be met for a lawful data processing. However, in countries such as the UK consent should be relied upon only as a last resort.​[37]​ This different interpretation is deemed to reflect the different conception that in most continental European States data protection is based on constitutional principles. Consent - as its essential component - has been a part of the constitutional doctrine of these States ever since the concept of the right to information self-determination took shape.​[38]​
Five key elements may be identified in Article 7 of the Directive, which should form the backbone of every domestic implementation of the notion of 'consent': (i) it must be unambiguous, as ambiguous consent does not preclude all doubts that the data subject has expressed their will, and therefore is not consent; (ii) it must be informed and (iii) specific so that all processing activities are properly described, as uninformed or vague consent is no consent; (iv) it must be freely given, as enforced consent obtained under coercion, undue influence, or pressure is no consent; (v) as a unilateral act, it is implicit that it must be revocable.​[39]​

(i)	Unambiguous consent
This element sheds light over the illegitimacy of assumed or implicit consent and some practices making use of it. This is the view taken by the large majority of EU Member States which require for any consent to be manifest. Likewise, such a consent seems to be not admissible for the purposes of data protection inasmuch as the data subject must express their will unambiguously for such an expression to be clear and conclusive.​[40]​ A non-response by a data subject is ambiguous as long as specific information is not provided and no option has been given to freely decide whether or not to agree. Arguably, therefore, consent should clearly emanate from the data subject in a way that no doubts exist over their agreement, whatever form it takes, oral or written.​[41]​
In online transactions, a frequent phenomenon is that of consent by opt-out, which enables the automatic processing of data unless a data subject explicitly objects to such data processed (i.e. s/he opts-out). As the Art. 29 Working Party advises, however, that explicit and unambiguous consent can also be given in the online environment. As in the offline domain, there are suitable technical means for delivering such consent. The Art. 29 Working Party notes that the risk of ambiguous consent is likely to be greater in the online world where specific attention is necessary.​[42]​
What is more, the Working Party has reiterated the unsuitability of consent based on individuals' opt-out or silence in the context of sending direct marketing through emails​[43]​ re-emphasising that “implied consent to receive such mails is not compatible with the definition of consent of Directive 95/46/EC (...). Similarly, pre-ticked boxes, e.g., on websites are not compatible with the definition of the Directive either”.​[44]​
In light of the proposed amendments to the EU data protection legal framework, it is now accepted and recommended that, as far as information and communication technologies in the consumer domain are concerned, the optimal solution is to counterbalance the benefits of technological advancements and risks for individual data protection by complementing the legal framework with the principle of “privacy by default and by design”. Accordingly, data protection safeguards should be incorporated in the design and operation of technologies and systems so that they will become default settings and new legal norms will provide for such binding requirement for technology designers and producers, as well as for data controllers. Hence, opt-in consent will become a key explicit element that allows the processing of personal data by data controllers that would otherwise be forbidden.​[45]​

(ii)	Informed consent.
The primary prerequisite for the validity of consent according to Article 2(h) of the Directive is that it must be informed. From the perspective of contract law, the question of how much information is needed before consent is sufficiently informed for a party to enter validly into a transaction is one that has troubled academic commentators for a long time.​[46]​ Information asymmetry has informed a great deal of consumer legislation. The issues relating to the disclosure notices in data protection terms raise additional complex questions on their own that would require a separate analysis. What needs to be stressed here is that data subjects must be properly and effectively informed, before the collection of the data, of the specific circumstances of the processing.​[47]​ Such a notice must be precise and intelligible to the data subject.​[48]​ Data subjects must understand the facts and implications of an action to be able to make informed choices, ensuring that they are effectively able to choose freely and voluntarily whether or not to take part into an agreement or in additional processing activities of their data for purposes not strictly necessary to the subject matter of the agreement. Moreover, data protection notices have the essential function of promoting transparency allowing data subjects to maintain control over information relating to them. For all these reasons, therefore, data processing notices should also disclose the data mining and manipulation techniques that may be employed, as well as the data aggregation procedures that may be in place.

(iii)	 Specificity and the other requirements of the law
Some may think that ‘consent’ is sufficient to legitimise data processing where no other legitimising circumstances of the Directive are met. However, in the terms of the Directive and most of the national implementing legislation, consent does not exist in isolation. It does not appear to be a sufficient basis on its own for legitimate data processing; it must be considered in conjunction with other requirements, particularly those relating to specificity, purpose limitation, and proportionality.​[49]​ For example, it would be a violation of the data protection principles to ask consumers to sign authorisations, that are unlimited in subject matter, essentially purporting to give permission to data controllers to process any personal data that they unilaterally decide to be relevant, and disclose that information for expanding purposes to any person willing to pay for it. By contrast, one of the primary concerns of the Directive is to ensure that data subjects consent specifically to all uses for which the data is processed. Processing based on consent cannot be regarded as lawful if sought for general or vague aims or if the data subject has no possibility of knowing the recipients of their data. This would be regarded as a way to evade the limitations imposed by the law.​[50]​
Moreover, since consent must be specific, it could be problematic to obtain the data subject’s consent if the occurrence and specific circumstances of a processing are not known at the time consent is requested, so that the impact on the data subject cannot be assessed.​[51]​ 
In the implementation of the Directive several countries have made it clear that even if a controller obtains the consent of the data subject, there are still the other requirements of the law to be respected; processing that does not meet those requirements is unlawful irrespective of the fact that consent has been given. This is because the right to data protection is often viewed not only as a personal right but also as a public concern and an issue of social protection embedded in the Constitutions of a number of Member States.​[52]​


(iv)	 Freely given consent
Another fundamental feature is that, as a general rule, each instance of consent should result from the free choice of the individual. Consent would be meaningless if people have no option but to consent in order to obtain a benefit or a service that could be provided nonetheless.
However, there are many situations where there is a clear power imbalance between the data subject and the business counterpart (data controller). What is more, the complexities of some business models, data collection tools and practices, vendor/customer relationships and technological applications may make it impossible for consumers to understand, or freely and actively decide to accept, the consequences of consenting to the processing of data, particularly when faced by perceived immediate economic or other benefits in kind.
The conditions for a free and voluntary consent lead to the very essence of its meaning, which has to be examined within the context in which it is provided.
As seen, the expression of will, in order to be regarded as having been given voluntarily, must refer explicitly to the processing of personal data, and not to the consent to conclude the principal contract. This would be already a sufficient reason to maintain that the refusal by a data subject to permit an amount of processing of personal data that is not necessary for the provision of a service, is not failure to consent to that service. Or, again within the category of data that does not fall within the ‘necessity principle’, it may well be the case that someone may agree with the processing of some data but not certain other data. A typical example is that of commercial marketing: no one denies that it is an important economic activity that would increase the profitability of an industry, this latter circumstance possibly being reflected also in an economic advantage for consumers. It is well accepted in data protection, however, that data controllers should not obtain consent to process the data for such a purpose if the goods or services may not be otherwise be purchased or obtained. According to the Directive, and read in conjunction with the proportionality principle, such a practice to obtain consent would lack its freely given element.​[53]​
However, some may reasonably contend that this application would contrast with the basic principle of ‘freedom of contract’, which relates but is different from the incorporation of data processing consent in the terms and conditions of contract. For example, if data subjects do not accept data controllers’ processing and own procedures, despite a separate request for consent has been made, and hence do not consent according to Article 7(a) of the Directive, then data controllers are free to refuse to enter into a contract which would leave the data subject without the good or service required. Either a data subject accepts to provide such a permission or a commercial organisation should be free to avoid any business with him/her. After all, parties of a contract, and commercial organisations in particular, do not have any obligation to enter into a contract with all applicants. If the data subject does not want to provide such a consent, s/he has always the alternative of not entering the contract.​[54]​
Others may contend that almost no contract is consensual because there is always pressure for everyone, for one reason or for another, in order to live in this world. This leaves no choices for the parties but to enter into contracts.​[55]​However, such views of the contractual type of consent neither correspond to the letter nor to the rationale of the Directive, whose enactment finds its justification in the protection of the freedom of individuals and the other values explained earlier.
At any rate, these two views, that share the thread to reduce the concept of consent to other concepts such as wrongdoing, efficiency, distributive justice and so on, have been thoughtfully criticised on the ground that people do not make use of consent in either of the ways mentioned above and that the reasons for consenting are not the same as the consequences of consenting. In this latter sense, the difference that is emphasised is between ‘consent’ and ‘causation’.​[56]​ Moreover, these are notions of consent that have been condemned for flirting with the myth of the equality of power in negotiations and relationships between organisations and individuals.​[57]​
Smith provides an interesting alternative account of consent. Focusing on the nature of the relevant pressure affecting the free and voluntary provision of consent in the context in which it is released, and accepting the imprecision of its notion, the scholar suggests that consent is free not only in the absence of pure states of necessity, but also in the absence of substantively unfair contracts.​[58]​
This is also the view adopted by other scholars who robustly maintain that for the notion of consent to work as a true source of personal responsibility, the individual would have to be in a strong bargaining position when facing a commercial organisation.​[59]​
All these considerations have pushed consumer lawyers to the point of doubting whether there are any general principles of traditional contract law left where consumers are involved, stressing how in these circumstances contract law operates in a manner quite distinct from the classical notion of freedom of contract.​[60]​
Looking at the issue of consent from this perspective, it may be noted that the concept of ‘unfair term’ is employed in the language of European consumer legislation.​[61]​ It finds its justification in the power imbalance between supplier and consumer, as well as in the perceived need of the law to be shaped in accordance with the costs and benefits of having standard form contracts.​[62]​ As such, the assessment of unfairness is subjected to the ‘good faith’ and ‘significant imbalance test’ of the parties. This notion is increasingly used in the area of data protection for the assessment of the provision of a valid consent by data subjects who are perceived to be in a position of having unequal bargaining power vis-à-vis data controllers.​[63]​ Actually, some commentators stress that the rationale for the data protection law in its current form is to enable individuals to bargain more effectively over the use of their personal information.​[64]​
Importantly, for the assessment of unfairness the tests make reference to the requirement of allowing a choice to the consumer, particularly in the absence of alternative contracts which do not contain the objectionable clause, and clauses which make consent a condition of the contract. It is suggested that a standard industry practice for uses of information which effectively deprive the data subject of a choice is questionable where such uses are not essential for the purposes of the contract.​[65]​
Others further question the validity of consumers’ consent for data processing purposes when it is solicited in exchange for economic advantages, or for fear of not being allowed to obtain goods or services, or for obtaining them at a lower quality.​[66]​ This phenomenon is also known as ‘engineered consent’ or ‘engineering of choice’: if data subjects have to give more information than is strictly necessary to buy goods or access services, then it is likely that they will consent to whatever broad uses of their data to obtain the goods or services. This objection has been supported by the Article 29 Working Party interpreting that “consent given by a data subject who (…) has been presented with a fait accompli cannot be considered to be valid”.​[67]​
In the end, therefore, consent might be formally free in the sense that there is not a single or traditional method of forcing individuals into a transaction by commercial organisations, but if the costs of not consenting are considerable in relation to the situation at stake, and there are no live options, then consent can be said not to be materially free.​[68]​

(v)	Revocability of consent
As a unilateral act, it is inherent in the nature of consent that it can be withdrawn by the data subject at any time, albeit without retrospective effect.​[69]​ Furthermore, consent may be withdrawn if the data processing is not necessary for the service provided, or it may be denied for a further processing that may be compatible, but still different, from the original purpose of the processing. This is the reason why consent is seen as an unlikely and ephemeral mechanism to provide an adequate long-term framework for data controllers in cases of repeated communications and further processing.​[70]​ Again, some may be tempted to think that a solution could lie in contract: consent, in fact, would not be withdrawn by a data subject, at least for a certain lapse of time, if it had been given under contractual arrangements which limit its withdrawal. However, for all the reasons explained above, in legal terms such an obligation should not be incorporated in the standard terms of a commercial agreement with consumers, leaving no option to consumers to exercise the right of withdrawal.
In the end, therefore, there remains little alternative but to agree with the Article 29 Working Party that interprets consent in data protection in a restrictive manner. They suggest that “relying on consent may therefore prove to be a ‘false good solution’, simple at first glance but in reality complex and cumbersome”​[71]​ and, lastly, that “consent is sometimes a weak basis for justifying the processing of personal data and it loses its value when it is stretched or curtailed to make it fit to situations that it was never intended to be used in. The use of consent ‘in the right context’ is crucial. If it is used in circumstances where it is not appropriate, because the elements that constitute valid consent are unlikely to be present, this would lead to great vulnerability and, in practice, this would weaken the position of data subjects in practice”.​[72]​

C. data processing consent vs. contract terms and conditions
The current normative approach to consent reflects the argument that the right to data protection rests on the individual’s choice about the processing of their data and that no one is better placed to judge and decide about the use of data than the concerned data subject himself/herself.
However, there may be instances, particularly in commercial transactions, where the empowerment of data subjects and the nature of ‘data processing consent’ may not be properly applied or they may be blurred. For example, it may be common to notice the complexities and difficulties surrounding the ‘free’ element of consent in the practice of including notices of data processing consent in the standard terms of contract for the purchase of goods or services, whether online, on hard paper, or verbally.
Conversely, treating consent as a transactional moment, such as using standard form or click-wrap agreements, may constitute a mechanical or pre-functionary means of obtaining overarching consent for data processing. The inclusion of data processing consent in the general terms and conditions of sale or services can be a common, yet subtle or elusive, method of obtaining consumer consent notwithstanding whether a transaction occurs online and irrespective of the opt-in/opt-out dichotomy. With the voluntary element being central to any form of agreement, consent becomes associated with the legal paradigm of contract. Acceptance of a contract by a consumer automatically signifies acceptance of a term or condition in a contractual clause whereby the consumer contextually agrees for the processing and/or communication of their personal data to third parties.
At this stage, a key distinction should be made: there are certain personal data that are necessary either for the performance of the contract to which the data subject is party, or to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into the contract. This is flagged in the Directive, which in Art. 7(b) states that the processing is fair provided that data subjects are informed of such processing. No consent would be required as the processing would fall within the other necessary conditions set by the law itself. In this case, such notice could well be placed in the terms and conditions of the contract. However, there are other data processing activities that, although motivated by asserted economic benefits, are not strictly necessary either for the performance of the contract or to take necessary steps prior to entering the contract. These are the cases where data controllers are tempted to maximise data collection and use for purposes beyond a necessary processing likely to have excessive scope or deep use conditions.
Arguably, however, an implicit or a contextual consent to data processing which is given by acceptance of the general terms and conditions of sale or service does not necessarily lead to unambiguous consent as required by Article 7 of the Data Protection Directive. On the contrary, this would represent a confusion of the concepts of ‘data processing consent’ and ‘agreement of contractual terms’. Accordingly, consent offers a procedural justification to the values and rights that data protection aims to promote and guarantee. If such rights have to be taken seriously, the abuse, confusion or conflation of consent should be avoided.​[73]​ An understanding of the difference between data processing consent and agreement of contractual terms may therefore shed some light over what would be necessary to ensure the standards governing its application and avoid the risk that it remains just a notional concept.
The consent to process personal data for the specific purposes of the contractual relationship between the parties of a contract should be distinct from the legitimisation of business organisations processing of consumers’ data for purposes related, but not essential, to the supply of goods or provision of services that are the subject matter of the underlying agreement. The former kind of processing, in fact, would be necessary in order to conclude and continue the business transaction per se, which is a processing separate from that of additional activities, even when these are ancillary to the principal relationship. As it would be necessary for the performance of the contract, it falls within the scope of Art. 7(b) of the Directive and it is not subject to a requirement of consent. This leads to the important consideration that, in consumer transactions, account may be taken of more than one type or instance of consent of the consumer/data subject: the consent that is a requisite for the conclusion of the legal dealing between a supplier and a consumer (the contract), and the consent of the consumer regarding the processing of their personal data. This means that consent for the processing of those data that are not covered by the necessity principle of Article 7(b) cannot be given by accepting the general terms and conditions of the service.​[74]​ This is also a corollary of the rule that ‘consent’ for data processing must be specific ex Art. 6(b).
In principle, the rights conferred by the data protection legislation are enjoyed by a data subject independently of the package that has to be negotiated with a supplier of goods or services, precisely in the same fashion described by Howells and Weatherill with regards of the rights conferred to consumers by consumer legislation or those enjoyed by workers under employment law.​[75]​
What is more, the function of consent in data protection is different from its function in contract: in the former instance it represents a permission for what would otherwise be a violation of a data subject’s right or, as defined by Brownsword, a procedural justification for the underlying right;​[76]​ in the contractual type of consent, by contrast, the function of consent would not be to give to one party a defence against the breach of the other party’s rights, but rather it means to create new rights and duties in the relationship between the parties.​[77]​
A thorough account of the reasons behind the importance of consent in contract law is provided by Smith, according to whom two possible explanations exist: i) consent matters because it is a prerequisite for establishing responsibility, and responsibility is a prerequisite for legal liability; ii) preferably, consent matters because a non-consensual contract may give rise to unjust enrichment.​[78]​
Arguably, none of the two suggestions would apply to consent under data protection law, unless one considers personal data exclusively as a commodity neglecting the rationale and justification of data protection. Indeed, advocates of the view that there may be a contractual relationship between the data subject and the data controller support the idea that individuals have proprietary rights on their information, which constitutes an asset in the information society, and therefore may be the object of economic transactions.​[79]​
As seen, however, the conceptualisation of data protection derives its normative force from fundamental values and freedoms, and not from property. Data processing consent, therefore, is a unilateral act, aligned with the fact that in the law it is neither always necessary nor always sufficient.​[80]​
Unlike in private law, thus, data processing consent would be best understood as providing to the data subjects an ongoing act of agency rather than an isolated instance of contractual agreement when the parties communicate their intention to be bound by a specific term.​[81]​




EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON ONLINE DATA PROCESSING

Further to the analysis of the legal framework which is in line with the opinion of the Art. 29 Working Party, data controllers should be encouraged to have in place procedures and mechanisms that ensure that effective consent is given, and that it is unambiguous, specific, and freely given. As suggested by the Art. 29 Working Party, the more complicated the environment in which data controllers operate, the more measures will be necessary to ensure that affirmative action is taken by data subjects. The suggestion is that, in the online environment, explicit consent may be given by use of electronic or digital signatures or through clickable buttons depending on the context, through confirmatory emails, a request to click on icons, etc.​[83]​ While there is no specific requirement as to the particular form in which the expression of consent has to take place, data controllers should make sure that consent is (1) unambiguous, (2) informed, (3) specific and (4) freely given; moreover, they also have to make sure that consent is (5) revocable at a later stage. These conditions are cumulative, meaning that consent is not valid if one of the first four conditions is not met at the moment of the collection of consent, and it is no longer valid if the data subject has revoked it at a later stage.
In this second part, we discuss the results of an empirical study on the level of compliance of UK online operators with the above discussed requirements of data protection law. 
The UK is a particularly interesting jurisdiction for this kind of study. The European Commission has opened infringement proceedings against the UK under Art 258 TFEU (ex Art 226 EC), which gives the Commission the power to take legal action against a member state that is not respecting its obligations under EU law.​[84]​ In particular, the Commission found that the UK fails to correctly implement and comply with the Data Protection and the e-Privacy Directives. The procedure originates from the Commission's investigation into the use, by internet service providers, of a behavioural advertising technology known as ‘Phorm’. In particular, according to the EU Commission, among some identified main gaps in the current UK data protection rules, UK law provisions do not comply with EU rules defining consent as a freely given, specific, and informed indication of a person’s wishes.​[85]​
This part is divided into two sections. In section A, we analyse the practices of a population of websites with respect to their methods of obtaining consent from data subjects. The analysis is oriented by a straightforward question: do data controllers obtain unambiguous, informed, specific and freely given consent from data subjects in order to process their personal data? The question is targeted specifically to the processing of personal data for purposes of direct marketing. In section B, we examine how websites act in response to expressions of consent from data subjects, or more precisely: how do they behave when data subjects deny consent for processing personal data and/or revoke consent at a later stage. To respond to this questions, we have made a test with unsolicited commercial emails (UCE). The amount of UCE sent to customers is a good proxy of whether the data controller has processed personal data unlawfully or not – i.e. without having obtained consent, or after the consent has been revoked.
	
A. Obtaining valid consent for data processing
The first part of the study explored the data protection practices of websites, and in particular the mechanisms of collecting personal data and of obtaining consent to process such data. It is standard practice for websites to collect personal data (name, address, telephone number, etc.) at the moment of the registration to their services. During the registration process, data subjects are also commonly requested to express their consent over the processing of their personal data for purposes other than those directly necessary for the performance of the contract, i.e. for the delivery of the online service. These “exceeding” purposes include a variety of activities that can be generally classified as direct marketing, which include the sending of commercial communication to the data subject. The method(s) through which consent is obtained for this purpose is the subject of our analysis.
The study was conducted on a sample of 200 websites with the domain ‘.co.uk’. The sample comprised of the most popular websites within the UK in a wide range of categories of e-commerce according to Google Ad Planner.​[86]​ It included websites in all categories of goods, services, information, news and entertainment, telecom and mobile, and social networking.​[87]​ Although very broad in scope, the sample was meant to represent ‘standard’ e-commerce and information services. For this reason, we have excluded websites that are likely to manage sensitive information, such as e-government and health services, and websites that may be subject to specific obligations regarding the processing of personal data or that may present issues specific to a single sector, such as finance and banking services. The choice of most popular websites only, instead of a combination of large and small online services, was also dictated by the expectation that large corporate players are in the best position to comply with legal requirement in the processing of personal data.​[88]​
As discussed previously, the law does not specify what is the form in which the expression of consent has to be given in order to be valid, and this leaves room for a variety of possibilities through which websites can seek consent from data subjects. A common method of obtaining consent is to ask the data subject to tick into a box or to select an option (yes/no) during the registration process. In order to examine the validity of these methods – i.e. the compliance with the conditions (4+1) discussed thoroughly earlier –a number of elements must be considered. These include: the amount and quality of personal data that is collected at the registration stage, the amount and quality of information that the data controller provides to the data subject at the moment of the expression of consent, the options that are given to the data subject at the registration stage and the mechanism through which s/he can signify his or her consent (e.g. “opt-in” or “opt-out”). There is also the mechanism for revoking or withdrawing consent at a later stage. All aforementioned elements have been identified by analysing the notice provided to customers in the document called “terms and conditions” and/or in the “privacy policy” (hereinafter T&C), and the mechanisms implemented by the website to register to its services. 
Thus, each website has been examined with respect to five features, namely: (1) the method of registration, (2) the mechanism adopted to obtain consent, (3) the types of data and information requested from the data subject, (4) the information provided in the T&C, and (5) the procedure to unsubscribe from the service and/or to revoke consent. Overall, subject to observation were 52 variables on each website.​[89]​ According to the analysis conducted in Part One, these variables can help identifying the elements upon which the validity of lawfully given consent is premised, namely that the consent must be unambiguous, informed, specific, freely given and revocable.

(i) The registration process
In order to avail some or all of the services provided by a website, customers may be requested to register or to create an account. Out of our population of 200 websites, only three did not have a registration process in place. The great majority offers to customers the option to register. When registering, data subjects are usually requested to submit a certain amount of personal data. Some data are necessary for the performance of the contract or to deliver the requested service, and their submission is a pre-requisite to successfully complete the registration. Other data, however, should be submitted at the discretion of the data subject. We will demonstrate later whether or not this is the case. The kind of compulsory data depends largely on the kind of service which is offered, and it is not possible to determine a priori whether a request for data adheres to the principle of proportionality, by being “adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected”​[90]​. For instance, a website offering a service of online dating may need to know the marital status of the subscriber, whereas this information is irrelevant to a different e-commerce service, such as telecom or news websites. Even requests of sensitive data may be justified in certain circumstances, although the processing of these data is subject to a more restrictive regime.​[91]​ 
Websites use different ways through which customers can create an account with them. The most popular way is a process where registration is completed by clicking a “sign-in” or “register” button after having filled in all compulsory fields. This is the system adopted by 95% of websites that have a registration process in place. Alternatively, websites can use a two-step process, where subscribers are sent an email with a link or an automatically generated password (or “activation code”) to be compulsorily used in order to complete the registration. In our sample, only 10 websites used a two-step process with email validation.
We have observed that there is a great variety as to the data that websites seek from data subjects during registration (table 1). Mentioning them in terms of frequency, the data that are sought to register with the website are the email address, name, postcode, country, address, telephone number, age and gender. Miscellaneous non-sensitive data include for instance marital status, mother’s maiden name or qualitative information such as the level of knowledge in a particular field, or the provision of a photo. Only 3 websites in our sample requested the submission of sensitive data.













In the course of the registration process, a certificate of security and https encrypted connection​[92]​ is present in 116 websites (58.6%). Out of them, however, it is only 67 websites (33.8%) that offer a secured encrypted connection at all the stages of the registration process. The practical consequence is that in two out of three cases the data subject is requested to submit personal data without any security as to who will receive the data.
In the following sections, we examine the behaviour of our sample websites in obtaining consent from data subjects to process their personal data. Our main focus shall be on how the websites seek consent for processing data in the context of direct marketing purposes. The mechanism of obtaining consent is analysed through the lenses of the key requirements of data protection law, namely informed, specific, freely given and unambiguous consent. 

(ii) Informed consent
As seen, when providing their personal data to register with websites, data subjects should be fully aware that they are consenting, and understand to what they are consenting, irrespective of the way by which the consent has been given. This requirement is split down into two obligations on behalf of the websites. The first is that the purpose of the processing should be clearly notified to individuals through clear and intelligible indications of the specific purposes for which the data will be processed. This means that the data subject should be given the option of making an informed choice on the basis of adequate information about data processing.​[93]​ For instance, in the UK Data Protection Act the informed character of the consent is essential in establishing fairness in the processing of personal data.​[94]​ 
The second requirement of informed consent is that individuals should be informed about the purposes of processing at the time of the collection of their data. This applies irrespective of the medium or the practical difficulties that may be raised.​[95]​ Data subjects should be informed at the outset of the purposes for which their information will be used so as to be in capacity of making informed decisions over entering or not this relationship. 
While it is a legal requirement that a data controller states clearly the purpose of processing personal data, there is no requirement as to the form in which this information has to be provided. Websites often declare the scope and purpose of data processing in the T&C. In our sample, only 3 websites did not have any privacy policy in place, while in 7 cases the link to the privacy statement was not active, and in 3 cases the document remained silent as to the purpose of data processing (table 2). Whereas the large majority of websites (93.4%) inform data subjects on the purpose of data processing, the information provided is not always satisfactory. As shown in table 2, some essential information is frequently missing from the privacy policy statement. This includes information over changes in the privacy policy, option to update personal data at later stage, and transfer of data to third parties. In particular, despite the fact that the law mandates that data subjects should be informed in case the purpose of data processing changes,​[96]​ and that they should be given the possibility to update their personal data at later stages, a large number of websites do not specify in their privacy policy whether these options are available. More specifically, websites do not indicate whether they will notify the data subject in case their privacy policy changes in 105 cases (54.1%) and they do not specify whether data subjects will be given options to update their personal data in 37 cases (19%). Although this does not mean that these websites do not comply with the respective legal requirements, the fact of omitting this notice means that the information communicated to data subjects in order to express informed consent is neither sufficient nor accurate.

Table 2 – Information provided to data subjects in the websites’ T&C

	Count	%
The privacy policy is not available	3	
The purpose of processing personal data is not stated	3	
The link to privacy policy or T&C is not active	7	
Total number of websites that do not provide any information	13	6.6%
The website does not specify whether...
it will notify the data subject in case of change of privacy policy	105	54.1%
the data subject has the option to update their personal data	73	37.6%
it will use data for direct marketing 	46	23.7%
it will transfer data to third parties	37	19.0%

As shown in table 2, 46 websites (23.7%) do not provide clear indications as to whether or not they will use personal data for the purposes of direct marketing or sending commercial emails, and 37 (19%) do not state whether or not they will transfer data to third parties. Because this information is not given, these websites are not entitled to engage in direct marketing or in transfer of personal data to third parties, since they have not obtained a valid consent to do so. In Part B, we will examine the actual behaviour of these websites in this respect. As far as transfer of data to third parties is concerned, the majority of websites restrict the scope of such “transfer” in various respects, and it has been observed, for instance, that 9 websites of our sample include the “selling” of personal data in the concept of data “transfer”. Table 3 provides an overview of these findings.

Table 3 – Transfer of data to third parties as specified in the T&C
	Count	%
The website will transfer data to third parties	157	79.8%
Only to known affiliates and/or subsidiaries	85	54.1%




While it is only a thin minority of websites that fails to inform data subjects as to their policy on processing personal data, the information they provide frequently lacks specificity and is not complete. In particular, two kinds of essential information may be omitted in the T&C, namely whether data will be processed for direct marketing purposes and whether or not they will be transferred to third parties. To conclude that these websites fail to obtain informed consent, however, it is important to establish whether or not they actually engage in these activities. We will address this issue in part B.

(iii) Separate consent: freely given and specific 
As discussed in the theoretical framework of Part One of this study, consent does not only need to be informed but it should also be specific and freely given. We discuss these distinct, yet strictly related, requirements together in this section.
To be specific, consent should relate to a defined set of activities about which the individual has been informed at the time of giving consent. Specific consent needs always to be informed; by contrast, informed consent may not necessarily be specific. For instance, a website may provide in its T&C information that personal data will be communicated to third parties without indicating which these parties are, or whether the data will be used for purposes of direct marketing; however, the website cannot lawfully engage in such processing unless the data subject has specifically consented to have their data processed towards that particular secondary purpose. What is more, as seen earlier, providing consent to the T&C does not satisfy the requirements of informed and specific consent for the purpose of direct marketing.
To be freely given, consent should be expressed by the data subject without fearing that s/he will lose the chance of availing some or all of the services offered by the website. This means inter alia that consent should be sought separately and not as part of the process through which the data subject agrees to the T&C of the website. ‘Separate consent’ is thus an umbrella term that encompasses the elements of specificity and freedom in order for consent to be valid.
Before outlining the behaviour of data controllers in obtaining consent, it is important to note that in 17 websites (8,5%) data subjects have not been given the possibility to express consent during registration in any form.
On the basis of our analysis on the requirement for the consent to be informed, 184 websites (93.4%) state the purposes of data processing in their respective privacy policies, although a significant portion of these websites fails to provide a clear and complete information on the conditions and purposes of such processing (supra, tab 2). As regards the requirement for consent to be specific and freely given, however, the number of websites that actually seek consent separately for a set of defined activities drops to 168 (85,3%) (tab 4). This leaves out 29 websites which either do not request consent in any form at the moment of the data collection (17 websites – 8,6%), or request the data subject to express consent by signing the contract with the website (i.e. by registering to the service), without however specifying how the data is going to be processed (12 websites – 6,1%). This latter set of websites deals with consent as a prerequisite of registration. A formula which is typically used in these cases is: ‘By registering and entering your details you consent to the [website’s] terms and conditions and privacy policy’ (consent to T&C), or alternatively ‘...you consent to [the website] sending you information about products and/or services that may be of interest to you’ (consent to direct marketing). While the first formula does not meet the requirement of specific consent, the second one does. This is because the purpose of data processing is explicitly mentioned (‘sending information’, etc.) and not only generically stated (‘agree to T&C’ and the like). However, consent in this case may be still be invalid since, when the website imposes consent as a prerequisite for availing from the services, the requirement for consent to be freely given may not be met.

Table 4 – Methods of obtaining consent
	Count	%
No expression of consent is sought	17	8,6%
Expression of consent automatically signified by registration	12	6,1%
Consent is referred to...		
T&C in general	9	
T&C and direct marketing	2	
Direct marketing only	1	
The data subject can express separate consent	168	85,3%

A wide majority of websites (85,3%) do request separate consent. This means that the expression of consent is not automatically signified by registering to the website but is sought individually as part of a separate transaction. In other words, the data subject is given the opportunity to register to the service without having to consent to data processing for direct marketing. As we have discussed in Part One, this is an essential prerequisite for an expression of consent to be valid.
As regards the websites which seek consent separately from the registration, our study indicates that there is not only great variety as to what data subjects are sought their consent for, but there is also diversity in the ways of phrasing the request for consent. Beyond these variations, the method used to obtain separate consent is essentially one: data subjects are requested to tick a box corresponding to an expression of consent.​[97]​ In order to identify the websites that seek specific and freely given consent for direct marketing, we have first made a distinction between the registration processes where the data subject is requested to tick in one box only and those where two or more boxes are available. Second, we have considered the wording of the expression(s) of consent in order to ascertain whether consent was sought with reference to the T&C (e.g. ‘I agree with the privacy policy’), to direct marketing (e.g. ‘I wish /I do not wish to be contacted by you’), or to both.
Table 5 illustrates the findings of this observation. The single-box system is adopted by 51 websites. In this group, 24 websites offer a box where only consent for purposes of direct marketing is mentioned. It is only these websites that meet the requirement for consent to be specific, namely covering direct marketing in particular. The other websites either do not seek consent for direct marketing (only consent to T&C; 18 websites) or ask consent for both T&C and direct marketing in the same box (9 websites).
The multiple-box system is used by 117 websites. These websites obtain consent by offering the option to click more than one box. Apart from a very small number of websites where all boxes refer to T&C only (5 websites), all other websites offer at least one box where the expression of consent addresses specifically the processing of data for purposes of direct marketing. In particular, 83 websites seek consent for both T&C and direct marketing, and 29 for direct marketing only. These two latter sets of websites obtain specific consent and meet the legal requirement for the consent to be informed and specific.

Table 5 – Mechanism for specifying separate consent
The data subject can express separate consent	168	85,3%
Separate consent is expressed...		
By clicking in a single box	51	
Referring to T&C only	18	
Referring to T&C and direct marketing	9	
Referring to direct marketing only	24	
By clicking in more than one box	117	
All boxes referring to T&C only	5	
Boxes referring to T&C and to direct marketing	83	
All boxes referring to direct marketing only	29	
Websites obtaining specific consent for direct marketing	136	69,0%

The sum of the websites that validly obtain specific consent for direct marketing is 136, which represents the 69% of the sample. The question is whether this specific, freely given and informed consent is also unambiguous. If consent is informed, freely given and specific, yet not unambiguous, it is not valid in light of the relevant legal requirements. We address the requirement for unambiguous consent in the following section. 

(iv) Unambiguous consent
In our study we have observed that websites follow different policies in seeking specific consent for direct marketing. It is not only the wording of the expression of consent that may vary significantly from website to website, but, most importantly, the form in which the consent is sought can be different. For example, one website can place the request in the following terms: ‘If you do not wish to receive our emails and our fantastic offer please tick this box’, while another website may say: ‘By ticking this box you consent to receive information about products and/or services that may be of interest to you’. Besides the specific wording chosen by each website to convey the message to their customers, there is an essential difference in the form of the communication between the data controller and the data subject: in the first case, the data controller asks the data subject to express a ‘non-consent’ or, otherwise put, to signify an objection to the processing of personal data for the purpose direct marketing; in the second case, the data controller seeks the data subject’s (positive) consent for the same activity. We refer to the first method as ‘opt-out’ and to the second one as ‘opt-in’.
The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has distinguished between someone who has been offered the option to object but has not used it (opt-out), and someone positively confirming their consent by ticking a box (opt-in).​[98]​ Direct marketing is lawful only if the recipient has previously freely given their consent to receiving such communications. The act of ticking a box is in principle a valid expression of consent. However, this should take place by actively consenting to the marketing, e.g. by ticking in a box to ‘opt-in’ to direct marketing activities, rather than to ‘opt-out’ from the same activities. In our view, opt-out does not result to valid expression of consent: this is because consent does not follow from the active input of the data subject but could result from a mere oversight of what was written in the sentence next to the box. 
Besides opt-in and opt-out there is yet a third option: it is when the website expresses the consent in the form of positive confirmation (opt-in) but the box is pre-selected. This means that the data subject has to actively de-select the box, should s/he not wish to consent to that particular data processing. Pre-selected opt-in is, again, a doubtful way of obtaining consent, since it may go against the requirement for consent to be unambiguous. In table 5 we compare the methods of obtaining specific consent, as followed by the websites comprising our sample.

Table 6 – Method of obtaining separate consent to process personal data 
	Count	%
The data subject cannot express specific consent for direct marketing	61	31.0%
The data subject can express specific consent to direct marketing	136	69,0%
By selecting opt-out from receiving ads / info	66	33,5%
By de-selecting opt-in to receive ads / info	38	19,3%
By selecting opt-in to receive ads / info	32	16,2%

As we saw earlier (table 5), 136 websites obtain specific consent for purposes of direct marketing. This represents the 69% of our sample. However, it is only 32 websites which seek consent in an opt-in mode. This amounts to a meagre 16,2% of the whole sample. Therefore, it is only 1 out of 6 websites that actually abides with the requirements for consent to be informed, specific, freely given and unambiguous, hence obtaining valid consent to process personal data for direct marketing purposes. 

(v) Revocable consent
In the context of valid consent, it is important, as we explained earlier, that data subjects are given options to revoke their consent at any time. This means that consent is valid only if it revocable, and this condition should not be restricted either contractually or practically. If an individual has consented to receiving emails for marketing purposes, the email s/he receive should incorporate an option of opting out of this service. 
In the following section (section B), we will examine the behaviour of the websites as regards the withdrawal of consent. Table 7 outlines the unsubscribing policies as declared in the T&C of the websites.





By sending email of notification	83	42.1%
By modifying user’s profile	53	26.9%
By clicking on link	49	24.9%
By writing to specific mail address	44	22.3%
By writing to a specific person	11	5.6%
By calling to a telephone number	10	5.1%
Other	7	3.6%

While the majority of websites specify a procedure for unsubscribing and having the personal data deleted (63.4% of the sample), the methods that websites use to offer this option vary. Most websites declare that they will delete the data upon receiving email notification (83 websites, 42.1% of the whole sample), or upon modification of a specific option in the profile of the data subject (53, 26.9%). Other websites offer an unsubscribing link in their T&C and/or in their commercial emails (49, 24.9%), or require the data subject to notify their choice of unsubscribing to a specific mail address (44, 22.3%). Options belonging to the pre-digital world, such as notification by post or telephone calls, are offered but are less frequent.

B. To What Extent Do UK websites respect consent?
In the previous section we have examined the practices of websites with respect to the legal requirement that consent for processing personal data for direct marketing purposes should be informed, specific, freely given and unambiguous. We have concluded that, although the majority of websites seek specific consent for direct marketing in one form or in another (69%), most of these websites do not obtain unambiguous consent within the meaning of EU data protection law. This is not to say that all of these websites will necessarily process personal data for direct marketing purposes; however, to the extent that they do so they would not have obtained the necessary consent within the requirements of EU law.
In this section, we endeavour to assess whether websites do respect consent in fact. Even though consent may be valid and lawfully sought, it may not be respected in practice – and vice versa: a website may obtain consent in a non-orthodox way and still respect it in practice. The question we address is the likelihood that a UK website processes personal data in two circumstances: when (1) consent for such processing is refused at the outset; and (2) consent is revoked at a later stage.
To answer this twofold question, we have conducted an empirical test. We have completed the subscription to the services offered by a sample of websites and have calculated the number of the emails received from each website over a given period of time. Under the conditions that we have set for our test, the quantity and quality of emails received can be used as an indicator that personal data have been processed unlawfully, i.e. in spite of the fact that the data subject has either refused or revoked consent. Emails that are sent without the consent of the recipient are termed as ‘unsolicited commercial emails’ (hereinafter UCE). Both the emails sent against consent to direct marketing and the emails sent after the data subject has requested removal of his or her personal data, fall under the definition of UCE. Emails sent with the consent of the recipients are, by contrast, ‘solicited’ emails and do not raise any issue of compliance. The empirical test was aimed at ascertaining how UK websites respect consent by analysing their behaviour with respect to the sending of UCE and of solicited emails.

(i) Methodology
To carry out the test, we have created a sub-sample of 100 websites out of the initial population of 200. This sub-sample was obtained by making a random selection from the groups of websites represented in Table 6 (supra), namely we have selected: 20 websites from the ‘opt-in’ group, 20 from the ‘pre-selected op-in’, 30 from the ‘opt-out’ and 30 from the group of websites that do not offer specific consent for direct marketing. Hence, we created 200 simulated identities (SI), provided with valid email address, home address and mobile telephone number. These SI were used to complete the registration process in all of the 100 websites. To be precise, we registered with each website twice: once, by instructing a SI to express a refusal to consent to processing data for direct marketing purposes - in whichever form the consent was sought from the website -(Registration 1)​[99]​ and a second time by instructing another SI to register to the website by expressing consent to such processing (Registration 2). After a period of 4 months, the latter SI notified the website that it withdrew the consent to process their personal data (in whichever form the website managed this withdrawal)​[100]​. The test was concluded after 8 months from the initial registration with the website.
	The following scheme summarises the actions that have been carried out with respect to each of the 100 websites of the sample:

0	4 m	8 m
Registration 1 	Consent refused
Registration 2	Consent given	Consent withdrawn
Initial expression of consent 	Revocation of consent	

	The grey area in the scheme above represents the status where there is no consent for the processing of personal data. The commercial emails that each SI received in the email accounts corresponding to Registration 1 or Registration 2 in that period of time can be defined as UCE. By contrast, emails received by SI further to Registration 2 during the first 4 months (white area) can be classified as ‘solicited’ commercial emails, i.e. emails sent with the consent of the recipient. While the total number of commercial emails indicates the extent to which websites process personal data for direct marketing, the number of UCE provides indicative evidence of whether websites process personal data unlawfully.​[101]​ Besides this quantitative evidence, we have also extracted qualitative information from the experiment. Both solicited and unsolicited emails can be sent either by the website to whom personal data has been submitted via registration, or by other subjects. In this last case, data have been transferred to third parties, and the domain name of the commercial emails received by each SI provides indirect evidence on websites practices with respect to the transfer of data to third parties.
	We discuss the findings of the experiment in the following section.

(ii) Emails received from websites as result of submission of personal data
During the 8 months time of the experiment, our 200 SI received over 3.000 emails. These include both solicited emails and UCE. Table 8 summarises the findings in relation to Registration 1 and 2.

Table 8 – emails received by registering to 100 websites
	Total number of emails	Average emails/month per website
Registration 1 (no consent)	661	0.8
Registration 2 after withdrawal (no consent)	958	2.4
Total UCE	1,620	1.4
Registration 2 before withdrawal (consent)	1,511	3.8
Total emails	3,131	

As expected, the probability of receiving emails is higher when consent for direct marketing is given: in this situation, one should expect to receive on average almost 4 emails per month (3.8) from each website to which s/he has submitted personal data. This number drops to 2.4 emails per month when the SI has revoked consent at a later stage. Where consent is refused at the outset, each data subject is expected to receive less than one email per month (0.8) from each website on average. Although the number of emails per month is different in each situation, it should be borne in mind that in the last two cases (refusal and withdrawal of consent) no commercial emails should be sent at all to data subjects. Practice indicates, however, that this is not the case and the overall average number of UCE is 1.4 emails per month from each website.​[102]​
	Not all websites have the same behaviour when it comes to direct marketing and commercial communications. From a quantitative point of view, our experiment demonstrates great variety as to the number of both solicited emails and UCE. With regards to solicited emails, a significant number of websites (28) do not engage in sending commercial information, despite the fact that these websites seek consent for direct marketing at the registration stage.
	With regard to UCE, a striking datum emerges from our test: almost half of the websites (48 out of 100) did engage in sending UCE to subscribers (Table 9). The amount of UCE sent over the whole period varies – from a handful of emails (less than 10 in 20 cases) to a maximum of 249 emails in one case – but the conclusion is unequivocal: when a data subject submits personal data to a UK website, there is a good 50% of probability of receiving commercial emails without consent.












In the following section, we analyse in more details the behaviour of these noncompliant websites.

(iii) Respect of consent refusal and of consent withdrawal
Websites may ignore consent in two ways. First, they may disregard the initial refusal of consent, and second, they may not take into account the subsequent revocation or withdrawal of consent. Both behaviours result in unlawful processing of personal data. Table 10 summarises the observed behaviour of websites with respect to initial refusal of consent and to subsequent withdrawal.​[104]​

Tab 10 – Processing of personal data and data subject’s consent
	# websites	%
Do not engage in direct marketing	28	
Engage in direct marketing	72	
Respect of all expressions of consent (initial refusal / subsequent withdrawal)	22 	30,5
No respect of initial refusal to consent	21	29,2
No respect of subsequent withdrawal of consent	16	22,2
No respect of any expressions of consent (initial refusal / subsequent withdrawal)	13	18,0
		100,0

As observed earlier, a significant number of websites (28) do not engage in direct marketing, namely they do not send any commercial emails in spite of the fact that they have obtained consent from data subjects to this end. However, it is more interesting to observe the behaviour of the websites that do engage in direct marketing by addressing commercial communications to data subjects (72). Out of these 72 websites, the great majority (which almost reaches 70%) does not respect at least one of the two expressions of consent that have been tested, namely: the initial refusal of consent (in the 29,2% of cases), the withdrawal of consent at a later stage (in the 22,2% of cases), while in the 18% of cases the website does not respect any expressions of consent (initial refusal or later withdrawal). Only a meagre 30 per cent of the tested websites respect consent at all stages, namely at the moment of data collection (initial refusal to consent to direct marketing – Registration 1 of our test) and at a later stage, when the data subject exercises the right to withdraw consent (Registration 2, month 4). 
	Based on these results, the question arises as to whether there is any correlation between the way in which a website seeks consent and the way in which the same website processes the data. To sharpen the question: is compliance with data protection law in obtaining consent a reliable predictor on whether the website will process personal data lawfully? We answer this question in the following section.

(iv) Method of obtaining consent and respect of consent
In the section A of this part, we have observed that websites have different methods of obtaining consent (see Table 6 above). According to our analysis, the proper way of obtaining unambiguous consent is the “opt-in” system, namely when data subjects are given the possibility of positively expressing their agreement to receiving commercial information or to otherwise agree on the processing of their personal data for direct marketing purposes. Other methods of obtaining consent, namely “opt-out” and “preselected opt-in”, do not result to valid consent, since consent might not be unambiguous, albeit being informed, specific and freely given. In Table 11 below, we have crossed the four clusters obtained in Table 6 with the data on the emails received from each website. This provides an indication on whether the respect of consent is related to the way in which websites obtain consent in the fist place.

Tab 11 – Forms of obtaining consent and respect of consent
	Engage in direct marketing​[105]​	Respect to initial refusal to consent	Respect to withdrawal of consent	Respect to both
All websites	72%	53%	59%	30%
No specific consent for direct marketing	73%	36.8%	57.9%	21%
Opt-out from direct marketing	62.5%	56%	56%	24%
Preselected opt-in to direct marketing	78%	66.7%	72.3%	50%
Opt-in to direct marketing	91%	50%	50%	30%

In a general framework of low level of compliance, websites that obtain consent through pre-selected opt-in boxes show the best level of respect of consent in all situations, and half of them respect both initial consent and withdrawal. Not surprisingly, the poorest performance in relation to respect of initial consent (only 36.8%) is shown by websites that do not seek specific consent. This is partially compensated by a better level of respect of subsequent withdrawal (57.9%, the second best performance after the ‘pre-selected opt-in’ websites). Yet, the overall compliance of websites that do not seek specific consent is the lowest of all websites (21%), followed by opt-out websites (24%) and opt-in websites (30%). Opt-in websites are more likely than others to engage in direct marketing activities (91% of them do send commercial emails) and demonstrate a level of respect which is in line with the average.
	The overall performance of each group of websites is better captured with reference to the quantity of emails that are actually sent to subscribers (Table 12).

Tab 12 – Forms of obtaining consent and emailing activity
	% of websites engaging in direct marketing​[106]​	Solicited emails (# per website)	UCE (# per website)
All websites	72%	5.5	2.0
No specific consent for direct marketing	73%	4.5	2.3
Opt-out from direct marketing	62.5%	5.1	2.1
Preselected opt-in to direct marketing	78%	8.8	1.6
Opt-in to direct marketing	91%	2.5	1.7

	The average number of UCE received from each website is the highest in websites that do not seek specific consent and is followed by the number of emails sent by the opt-out websites (over 2 UCE per month, on average). Websites using opt-in and pre-selected opt-in send UCE too, but on a lower degree (1.7 and 1.6 emails per month, respectively). As to the lawful direct marketing (solicited emails), it can be observed that the websites that demonstrate the highest level of activity are those that obtain consent through pre-selected opt-in (although the data is influenced by the presence in this cluster of 3 of the 4 websites that have sent more than 100 emails – see Table 8 supra). 
Overall, the figures confirm that, in a general framework of low level of compliance, websites that seek separate consent show a relatively better compliance than those that do not have a separate consent system in place – both in terms of actual respect for consent at all stages (initial consent and subsequent withdrawal) and in terms of number of UCE that are sent to subscribers. Amongst websites that ask for separate consent, the pre-selected opt-in websites demonstrate the best performance. By contrast, the opt-out websites show the poorest level of performance amongst the websites that do seek specific consent: a level which is close to that of the websites that do not request specific consent.​[107]​

(v) Transfer of data to third parties
Personal data that are submitted to a website in the registration process can be transferred to, and processed by, third parties. Indirect evidence that data have been transferred to third parties is provided by the domain name of the commercial emails received as a consequence of the subscription to a website. When all emails come from one unique sender, we can conclude that data have been processed by one single data controller, presumably the website that has initially collected the data. By contrast, when emails originate from more than one unique sender, we may infer that data have been processed by other subjects too, to which the data have been transferred. Table 13 summarises the findings of the test. Out of 72 websites that have sent at least one email, 27 have sent emails from one unique sender and 45 from more than one unique sender. A qualitative screening of the unique senders reveals that 33 are presumably affiliated in some way with the initial website, either because their domain name is a sub-domain of the website (e.g. marketing.domain.co.uk), or because other kinds of connection can be established (e.g. same domain name but different extension). In 16 cases we have found emails from domain names that are not related with the initial website and do not bear any signs of possible connection. Incidentally, we have observed that emails with the same domain name may originate from different websites; this means that different websites have transferred the data to the same subject, presumably a company specialised in direct marketing.

Table 13 – Email senders
	# websites 
Emails from 1 unique sender	27
Emails from more than 1 unique sender	45




When data have been transferred to third parties, the question arises as to whether the withdrawal of consent at later stage is effective with respect to these parties too or not. In other words: when a data subject exerts their right to have their personal data removed by a website, will this also cover the data that the website has in the meantime transferred to third parties? The limited size of our sample does not allow drawing statistically significant conclusions. However, we have observed that in at least 4 cases the SI continued to receive emails from a sender different than the original website after having withdrawn consent. At the same time, there is no clear indication that websites that do transfer data to third parties are less likely to respect the withdrawal of consent.​[108]​

Conclusions
This paper investigated data processing consent as the linchpin of EU data protection legislation. With the Treaty of Lisbon data protection has been upgraded as a provision of general application and formally recognised as a fundamental right of the EU. Normatively, data protection and privacy have been re-conceptualised as a bundle of legal rights and tools to pursue the common goal of a democratic society, not only free from unjustified intrusion and surveillance but where citizens may develop their personality freely and autonomously through individual reflexive and active participation in society. Therefore data protection principles, as a legal tool, should be seen as less procedural and more substantive to protect and guarantee the underlying fundamental values. Consent is a crucial component of data protection law to give effect to the goal it purports to achieve giving individuals the tool to have control over their personal information and the persona they project in society.
The aim of this study is to provide empirical evidence on the practice of obtaining consent and respecting a person’s wishes with regard to the processing of their personal data by online operators. The study focused on e-commerce services and the UK jurisdiction.
The findings of the study demonstrate a significant departure between EU legal theory and practice in the UK. In particular, to the extent that only ‘opt-in’ mechanisms can be considered as valid methods of obtaining unambiguous consent under the requirements set by EU law, the study shows an extremely low level of compliance. It reveals that only a meagre 16.2% of websites obtain a valid form of consent to process personal data for purposes of direct marketing. However, the fact that a wide majority of websites (69%) has in place a system to request separate consent for engaging in marketing activities—although in the forms of ‘opt-out’ or ‘pre-selected opt-in’ mechanisms—, illustrates that there is a general awareness of the importance of obtaining consent before processing data. This suggests that there is a lack of, or inappropriate standard of information on what the law requires, especially in light of the clarifications provided at EU level. In this respect, this study confirms the view of the EU Commission in the Phorm case of a poor implementation and compliance of the UK with EU rules. 
Yet, besides the compliance with formal legal requirements, the practice of websites in processing personal data confirms a scenario of bad performance. This is substantiated by the test on the frequency of UCE sent by websites. The test shows that less than a third of websites (30.5%) respect the will of the data subject not to receive commercial communications. Even though a significant number of websites do not send commercial emails at all, in spite of asking consent to do so (28%), the likelihood of submitting personal data to a website that will ignore the refusal of consent and will send UCE is still surprisingly high (50%). Moreover, the sending of UCE may represent only the most visible indicator that personal data have been processed unlawfully. In fact, other less visible processing activities exist that are very difficult, if not impossible, to detect. One can only speculate on whether or not such unlawful processing of personal data also extends to other privacy-invasive and prejudicial activities, such as user profiling, behavioural advertising, or price and service discrimination.
What is more, the study unveils that the way in which websites obtain consent (opt-in, pre-selected opt-in, or opt-out) is not a proxy of lawful processing of data at a later stage. However, the survey demonstrates that websites that do not ask for separate consent at all are more likely to engage in further unlawful processing at a later stage than those websites that collect consent separately. This suggests that the high level of non-compliance can be partially explained as the effect of a deficit in information rather than of a conscious infringing behaviour.
A final consideration may need some attention. The survey has been carried out on a sample of the most popular UK-based websites. Less popular websites according to the set criteria have not been scrutinised. As a conjecture, it may be assumed that minor players or bogus websites engage in even lower levels of compliance.​[109]​ On a pure speculative level, arguments may be developed that the size of a commercial venture may bring with it a reputation collateral that forces firms to maintain compliance high. Thus, the suggestion is that the overall website performance may be worse than the one resulting from the study.
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